ALAP 2020

IX Congreso de la Asociación Latinoamericana de Poblacion

9 a 11 diciembre

EL ROL DE LOS ESTUDIOS DE POBLACIÓN TRAS LA PANDEMIA DE COVID-19 Y EL DESAFÍO DE LA IGUALDAD EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE

Xiana Bueno García
Centre d'Estudis Demogràfics, Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona

Wanda Cabella
Programa de Población, Universidad de la República

Ignacio Pardo
Programa de Población, Universidad de la República

Gender-role Attitudes and Fertility Ideals in Latin America

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Abstract

The relationship between fertility and gender roles has been the object of vibrant debates in developed societies. Under the umbrella of the 'gender revolution', scholars have theorized that greater gender-egalitarianism will lead to higher fertility in low-fertility countries paying particular attention to how men and women perform their roles in the public and the private spheres. Is this premise applicable to Latin-American countries whose fertility transitions might have been different from those in other developed regions in terms of gender-role change and socio-economic development? Do the egalitarian-traditional axis of Latin American men and women follow a similar pattern than in Europe in terms of fertility preferences? We use data from the 2012 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) in the four available Latin American countries -Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela- to explore the link between men's and women's gender-role attitudes in the public and private spheres and their fertility ideals.

1. Introduction

The fertility transition in Latin America started in the early seventies for most of the countries in the region. From 1970 to 1990, fertility levels experienced a steep decline largely as a result of the reduction of infant mortality (Chackiel and Schkolnik 2004) and a wider access to contraceptive measures (Guzmán 1996). Fertility levels dropped from about 6 children among women born in the 1930s to 2-3 children among those born in the 1960s (Lima et al. 2018). Since the 1990s, fertility has continued to decrease at different paces, until getting to levels near two children in many countries (Cabella and Pardo 2014). By 2020, the process is consolidated and fertility levels in some countries are even below replacement, often after a strong reduction of adolescent and early fertility rates.

A fertility decline is, to a large extent, preceded by a reduction of individuals' ideal family size. The lack of correspondence between fertility behaviors and fertility ideals becomes more and more common worldwide. Still, trends of *unrealized* fertility in many developed countries coexist with a mix of the historical magnitude of *unwanted* fertility (Boongarts and Lightbourne 1992; Casterline and Mendoza 2009) and an emerging trend of *unrealized* fertility in Latin America (Rodriguez-Wong 2009). Yet, the rapid fertility decline in the Latin American region is undoubtedly connected to a smaller ideal family size, showing a consistent trend towards the two-child norm (Casterline and Mendoza 2009).

Individual fertility preferences have proved to be good predictors of fertility behavior (Miller, 2011; Testa, 2011; Thomson, 2002). More than 15 years ago, Goldstein et al. (2003) hypothesized that a decline in fertility ideals might follow a decline in period fertility, with a 20-30 year lag. This might be explained by younger generations adopting a small family ideal after seeing it as a reality in older generations. Although this hypothesis cannot be taken for an established fact, fertility ideals give a clue on probable future trends and provide a valuable measure in itself, even acknowledging criticism made of the usual measures of ideal/desired family size. As it happened in Western countries, the onset of the fertility decline in Latin America was driven by the highly-educated, higher-income, urban individuals, and it was gradually extended to other social strata (Schkolnik and Chackiel 1998). Yet, socioeconomic characteristics by itself are not as explanatory of fertility, as in its combination with changes in gender-roles, women's labor-force participation, and the institutional context.

Indeed, the decline of fertility levels in Europe, East Asia and other developed societies has been closely linked to a reconfiguration of gender norms and attitudes regarding family life. A set of ideational changes first observed in Europe, were considered together under the framework of the Second Demographic Transition by Lesthaeghe (1995) and Van de Kaa (1987). At a macro level, there is large theoretical support for the idea that the pre-transitional roles that men and women used to perform in the public and private spheres are no longer valid and while women have quickly adapted their roles in the work and family dimensions, men lack behind. Demographers, sociologists, and gender scholars defined this process as an *unfinished* gender revolution (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, & Lappegård, 2015; McDonald, 2000a, 2000b) and do not predict a recovery of fertility until such process is completed. Yet, numerous scholars have pointed to the stagnation of such a process (England 2010;

Friedman 2015; Sullivan et al. 2018). This theoretical debate emerges in a set of countries characterized by having low (or relatively low) fertility levels but in which social surveys have revealed a phenomenon of *unrealized* fertility -individual fertility ideals and intentions tend to be higher than actual fertility- (Hagewen and Morgan 2005, Sobotka and Beaujouan 2014). This phenomenon is not merely circumscribed to the ideational level. It has been shown that a strong link exists between unrealized fertility and macro-level contextual factors such the economic cycle, the labor market conditions, or the gender inequality at the institutional level and family policies (Brinton et al. 2018, Mills 2010, McDonald, 2006). Yet, some cross-cultural studies have warned us about how the way in which gender operates at the macro-level in different countries might give a different meaning to similar individual gender-role attitudes (Bueno and Oh, 2021, Mason 1997, Westoff and Higgins 2009).

In sum, theories explaining the fertility decline have been originated to explain reproductive trends in Europe and other developed societies giving a strong protagonism to the role of gender in the public and private spheres of individuals' lives. However, previous literature has not sufficiently explored the link between gender-role attitudes and fertility preferences in the Latin American region. How do these theories fit into the Latin American context? In developed countries, it is assumed that the majority of the population has absolute control of their fertility (Van de Kaa 1987). In general, people do not have more children than they want to have. This does not necessarily occur in Latin America, not in all countries, not in the lower socioeconomic strata, or between rural and urban regions (Boongarts and Lightbourne 1992). Indeed, there is evidence in the Latin American context of the coexistence of *unmeet* fertility together with the opposite phenomenon, *unwanted* fertility, by which actual fertility sometimes surpasses one's ideal number of children (Casterline and Mendoza 2009, Hakkert 2004) often due to the lack of access to contraceptive measures. Similarly, old and new paradigms related to gender norms and individual attitudes also coexist in the region (Barker et al. 2004) with several studies confirming for Latin America, as it happens in many other contexts, the contradictions emerging between gender-egalitarian attitudes and gender-traditional behaviors (Almeras 1997).

To link fertility ideals and gender-role attitudes might help us to envision whether or not these two factors have a similar interaction in different regions and at different times. In this work, we aim to answer the following three research questions. First, can we identify in the Latin American context similar frictions between gender-role attitudes and fertility ideals than in developed societies? Second, how individual's fertility ideals vary depending on gender-role attitudes applied to the public or to the private domains? Third, to what extent there is an identification between individual gender-role attitudes and macro-level dimensions such as the labor-market or the State support for families?

This work contributes to the literature and the theoretical debate on gender roles and fertility. There is little empirical evidence in the Latin American countries in this regard. The Latin American countries entail a stimulating case study because both, the fertility decline and the 'gender revolution' are advancing at different paces in different countries.

2. Measuring gender-role attitudes in the public and private spheres to inform fertility preferences

Understanding the lens from which individuals see men's and women's roles in the workplace and the family is key for understanding fertility preferences (Kaufman 2000). For several decades, social surveys have included questions on gender-role attitudes that help us to explore the level of support that individuals give to how men and women perform or distribute paid and unpaid labor. One of the main controversies in the literature employing gender-role attitudinal questions is, in fact, the decision of taking these two areas -work and family- together or separately. Thus, gender scholars have discussed the theoretical and empirical implications of its use for the analysis (Goldscheider et al. 2010, Grunow et al. 2018, Knight and Brinton, 2017).

As a conclusion, it seems to be a general agreement on separating the public and private domains -paid and unpaid work, productive and reproductive spheres, work and care responsibilities- no matter which terms are used. Nevertheless, some scholars (Cotter et al. 2011, Grunow et al. 2018, Knight and Brinton 2017) argue that separating spheres does not solve the issue that makes gender-egalitarian and gender-essentialist views compatible with each other.

For example, on the one hand, someone might agree that men and women should both contribute to the household income and, at the same time, maintain a gendered view in considering that the woman should be the primary caregiver for the children. This kind of ambiguity has been theorized by Charles and Grusky (2004) under a new conceptual frame named 'egalitarian essentialism' that gives support and equal value to women's individual choice of either being employed or being a stay-at-home mother. This cultural frame would make liberal egalitarianism compatible with beliefs on gender-essentialism based on the freedom of choice and refusing a lower status label for women who opt to care. Further research in this regard have gone beyond the dichotomy traditional vs. egalitarian to operationalize and highlight the *multidimensionality* of gender-roles in which there is room for different constellations (Grunow et al. 2018, Knight & Brinton 2017).

On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the assumptions made on pre-conceptions of gender-egalitarianism or traditionalism might also be misled. Thus, a choice of being a stay-at-home mother might come from a person with egalitarian attitudes, while, for instance, a strong agreement with the idea that women, as well as men, should work full-time may conceal an inherent acceptance and maintenance of the occupational sex-segregation and perpetuate gender inequality in the labor market. While for the purpose of this study we employ gender-roles attitudinal questions within the traditional-egalitarian axis, we also embrace the multidimensional framework by considering separately the public and the private spheres.

Literature relating gender roles -attitudes or behaviors- and fertility -actual, ideal or intended- is abundant. Numerous studies have explored the relationship between gender (in)egalitarian behaviors (housework and childcare) and fertility preferences (e.g. Mills et al. 2008, Sullivan et al. 2014, Tazi-Preve et al. 2004). Other studies have explored macro-level indicators of gender inequality and fertility preferences (Mills 2010) or as Arpino et al. (2015) related gender-role attitudes with macro-level fertility (TFR). However, the literature relating gender-role attitudinal questions and fertility ideals or intentions is relatively more scarce. Some studies found a positive

association between egalitarian attitudes and fertility intentions in the European context (Testa 2007, Puur et al. 2008), albeit Kaufman (2000) arrived at the same results for men but not for women in the United States and Philipov (2008) found mixed results in this regard. Adding to these divergent findings, Westoff and Higgins (2009) after replicating Puur et al. (2008)'s study with a different dataset, found that men's egalitarian attitudes were associated with lower fertility, and not higher, as Puur et al. (2008) suggested. These apparently opposite findings evidenced the controversy about how to effectively measure and relate gender-role attitudes and fertility. To this particular contend, Goldscheider et al. (2010) replied to Westoff and Higgins (2009) stressing the need for measuring separately the gender roles in the public and in the private spheres.

The measurement of the ideal, desired, or intended fertility in social surveys has also been the focus of some methodological debates. Philipov and Bernardi (2011:496) alert us 'The ideal number of children is ambiguous because the concept of "ideal" is unspecified: it may refer either to the best number of children or to the best conditions of life.' Thus, the interpretation of 'ideal' might show a reflection of societal norms rather than a personal ideal number of children (Testa 2007). An additional discussion relies on how the individual current conditions and constraints interact with their answers, with some scholars arguing that short-term fertility intentions represent a better indicator to approach fertility (Philipov and Bernardi 2011). Blake (1974) points out that the question on ideal family size tends to not include the option 'zero' as a possible answer preventing from considering childlessness as an option. In sum, some scholars have questioned the reliability of studying ideal family size with arguments such as its small variance, its high correlation with the actual number of children, or the fact that its level of abstraction distances it from real decision making (Sobotka and Beaujouan 2014).

3. Fertility Ideals and The Gender Revolution in the Latin American context

3.1. Theoretical considerations

Theories of gender role change such as the Gender Equity Theory (McDonald, 2000a, 2000b), the Female Revolution (Esping-Andersen and Billari, 2015) or the Gender Revolution (Goldscheider et al. 2015), posit that such a process happens in two stages. In the first stage, there is an increase in gender equity in the public sphere observed through women's gains in education and labor force participation. Such significant change in women's role in the public domain is not accompanied by an equivalent increase of men's sharing of domestic and childcare tasks in the private domain, thus, generating a double burden for women (Hochschild and Machung 1989) and a lowering of fertility levels. In a second stage, it is expected that as men increase their sharing in unpaid work, families will achieve a more desirable work-life balance which will contribute to a recovery of fertility.

Should we assume that all countries will follow this two-step pattern? This question is not new. A similar one was formulated in the past by scholars who wondered whether other regions in the world will follow the changes associated with the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) within the same terms and at the same pace as Northern-European countries did (Sobotka 2008). While some evidence of the SDT was found in Southern and Eastern Europe (Guetto et al. 2015, Hoem, et al. 2009; Kertzer et al., 2009, Sobotka et al., 2003; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2004), other studies

found partial or no evidence in regions such as the U.S. (Raley, 2001), Russia (Perelli-Harris and Gerber, 2011), or East and Southeast Asia (Atoh et al. 2004). The debate on changes in gender roles and family dynamics was also present in Latin America (Arriagada 1998, Chant 2002).

However, recent studies from Grunow et al. (2018) and Knight & Brinton (2017) measuring gender-role attitudes have challenged the general expectation that all countries will converge to liberal egalitarianism, thus giving space to a range of positionings toward gender-roles which represent the multidimensionality of this phenomenon. Likewise, the role that the macro context might have over the gender-role change and its link to fertility can not be neglected. Social and family policies, labor-market institutions, and economic uncertainty are factors that also interfere with gender-roles and fertility decisions in societies where more and more the share of dual-earner couples increases.

Previous literature on ideal family size has highlighted the importance of the two-child norm across developed societies (Sobotka and Beaujouan 2014). Latin American countries seem to follow the same pattern, as informed by the decrease in ideal family sizes reported across generations. Using the 2000 round of DHS surveys in the region, previous research has shown a mean ideal number of children between 1.9 and 2.5 children for all countries among younger cohorts aged 15-24 years old (Casterline and Mendoza 2009), while focusing on older cohorts of women aged 40-49 years old, Rodriguez Wong (2009) showed figures always higher than 2.5 children, among which women from the lower socio-economic stratum tend to report higher ideals than better-positioned women. In addition, a comparison over time shows how among women at the end of their reproductive period, the gap between completed fertility and ideal fertility squeezes, thus reducing the occurrence of *unwanted* fertility , while in countries like Colombia, Perú or Dominican Republic the women at the highest socioeconomic strata show evidence of *unmeet* fertility (Rodriguez Wong 2009). These findings support and motivate our research questions and hypotheses.

3.2. Hypotheses

Little is known about the interconnection of fertility ideals and gender-role attitudes in Latin America. Do egalitarian couples have higher fertility ideals than traditional couples because they are more likely to have a double income and greater co-responsibility in the home and caregiving? Do traditional couples have higher fertility ideals because they expect a gendered division of the productive and reproductive responsibilities or, on the contrary, also in Latin America the expansion of women in the labor market has made a dent in their fertility ideals by not being accompanied by a men's incursion into the domestic sphere thus alleviating the 'double burden' on females?

Following Goldscheider et al. (2010)'s discussion on the importance of separating the men's and women's roles on the public and private dimensions to inform fertility preferences and under the frame of the gender revolution theory, we hypothesized for the Latin American region that:

> *H1 Lower gender-egalitarian attitudes both in the public and the private spheres will favor higher fertility ideals*

H2. Greater gender-egalitarian attitudes both in the public and the private spheres will also favor higher fertility ideals.

H3. Gender egalitarian attitudes in the public sphere combined with traditional ones in the domestic realm will result in lower fertility ideals for women more than for men.

H4. Driven by the increasing female educational expansion, labor-force participation, and economic independence, egalitarian women will have higher fertility intentions than egalitarian men.

4. Data and Methods

We use data from the 2012 *Family and Changing Gender Roles* module of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). We select the four available Latin American countries: Argentina (N=977), Chile (N=1564), Mexico (N=1527), and Venezuela (N=997). The total sample for this study is 5,065 individuals, 56% of them being women. The sample includes men and women aged 16 years and older. Our analytical sample includes individuals between 16 and 49 years old to reflect those ages in which family formation decisions might take place.

Our dependent variable is the respondents' ideal number of children. ISSP asks for 'general' (and not 'personal') ideal family size, as the answer to the question '*All in all, what do you think is the ideal number of children for a family to have?*'. Answers are coded as closed numeric responses with no ranges allowed and include one non-numeric answer -'can't choose'- which has been excluded from the analysis (N=160). The fertility ideals' question also contained 135 missing cases excluded from the analysis. Taken together, 5.8% of the original sample has been excluded, from which about half of the cases belong to the Chilean subsample.

To measure individuals' gender role attitudes we use four different questions (Table 1), two of them refer to roles in the public sphere (Indicators 1 and 2) and two refer to the private sphere (Indicators 3 and 4). At the same time, we purposely combined two items that represent gender normative images according to what it has been considered 'traditional' gender roles measuring the agreement with a belief in separate spheres (Indicators 1 and 3), and two gender-neutral items that do not depart from a pre-assignation of gender roles (Indicators 2 and 4). Previous research has proved the validity and reliability of these questions as indicators of gender-role attitudes (Davis & Greenstein 2009:89).

Table 1: Gender-role attitude questions selected.

	Assigned gender roles	Unassigned gender roles
Public sphere	Indicator 1. “A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family”	Indicator 2. “Both the man and woman should contribute to the household income”
Private sphere	Indicator 3. “A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children”	Indicator 4. “Consider a family with a child under school age. What, in your opinion, is the best way for them to organize their family and work life?”

Source: own elaboration

For each indicator, we have dichotomized the answers into the traditional-egalitarian axis to approach country and sex differences. In doing this, we necessarily attribute a neutral response such as ‘neither agree nor disagree’ into one of the poles. Since our aim is to measure the effect of gender egalitarianism, our criteria were to add neutral responses to the ‘traditional’ block. For example, for indicators 1, 2 and 3, respondents give their level of agreement to a specific statement. Responses are recorded on the five-point Likert scale: (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. The answers to indicator 2 have been reverse-coded so the three items match in that value ‘1’ always reflect agreement with a ‘traditional’ response and the value ‘5’ reflects an agreement with an ‘egalitarian response.’ Hence, responses 1, 2 and 3 represent a traditional view. The answer categories for indicator 4 are: (1) mother at home, father full-time; (2) mother part-time, father full-time; (3) both, mother and father full-time; (4) both, mother and father part-time; (5) father part-time, mother full-time; (6) father at home, mother full-time; (7) Can’t choose. In this case, responses 1 and 2 represent the ‘traditional’ view.

We first explore descriptively the association between fertility ideals and the four selected indicators of gender-role attitudes by country and sex. In a second step, we run linear regression models in which our dependent variable is the ideal number of children. Our main independent variables are the four gender-role attitudes indicators specified above. Additionally, we include a set of control variables including sex, age, education, attendance to religious services, urban/rural residence, and personal income. We first run a pooled model (Model I) followed by country-specific models (Models II to V).

Gender-role attitudinal questions entail certain limitations that need to be mentioned. First, one of the criticisms derived from its measurement is the fact that some of the items depart from an already pre-conceptualized gender-essential division of roles (Davis & Greenstein 2009). Items that are based on notions of what *used to be* expected for men and for women in the public and

private spheres rather than inquiring about the same items for males and for females. Thus, an intrinsic bias is rooted in the way 'gendered labels' are attributed to gender-role related questions (Davis & Greenstein 2009). In favor of comparability and continuity, the questions' wording has been dragged over time since the original social surveys from the 1970s showing little adaptation to new social trends (Cotter et al. 2011). In this sense, to measure egalitarian attitudes in this study, we purposely chose gender-neutral questions -Indicators 2 and 4- in which men's and women's roles are considered equal and are not preconceived.

Second, the complexity in measuring attitudinal questions increases if we account for how individual experiences might interfere with individual attitudes. In this sense, there are qualitative studies that with the advantage of going beyond close-ended questions have highlighted how individuals' reality (lived experiences) sometimes differ from their beliefs about men's and women's roles in employment and family responsibilities (Hochschild and Machung 1989).

Third, attitudes are sensitive to age, life-events, and the macro context around us (Davis & Greenstein 2009). Thereby, these measures can capture different beliefs at different moments of an individual's life-course and in different country settings. Fourth, in this last sense, when comparing country contexts, it has been noted how the same survey may ask about gender using different wording to adapt to cultural contexts adding an extra challenge for its measurement (Westoff and Higgins 2009). In the case of the 2012 ISSP Spanish questionnaires, the questions slightly change in the use of some words in the four studied countries, but they are virtually the same. On the side of fertility ideals, its measurement can be affected by the fact that people do not tend to report ideals below their actual number of children, while sometimes provide non-numeric responses. In addition, it has been argued that responses of ideal fertility are influenced by individual or societal various economic and social constrain

5. Defining ideal fertility country profiles based on gender-role attitudes

5.1. Four countries, four macro-level contexts

(*to be extended*)

Table 2: Country context indicators in 2012.

	Argentina	Chile	Mexico	Venezuela
Fertility indicators				
Children per women [3]	2.35	1.83	2.29	2.42
Mean ideal number of children [4]	2.54	2.53	2.29	2.42
Adolescent birth rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19) [2]	63.2	54.6	68.6	89.1
Gender-role attitudes				
#1. "*A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family*" (1=Trad., 5=Egal.) [4]	3.11	3.19	2.75	3.08
#2."*Both the man and woman should contribute to the household income*" (1=Trad., 5=Egal.) [4]	4.11	3.92	4.16	3.95
#3."*A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children*" (1=Trad., 5=Egal.) [4]	2.46	2.66	2.51	2.70
#4. "*Consider a family with a child under school age. What, in your opinion, is the best way for them to organize their family and work life?*" (% answering '*Mother at home or part-time, father full-time*') [4]	83.2	78.6	71.4	82.9
Gender inequality				
Gender Gap Index (GGI), Country ranking (1–135) [1]	32	87	84	48
Gender Development Index (GDI) [2]	0.989	0.962	0.952	1.023
Human Development Index (HDI) [2]	0.823	0.818	0.752	0.767
Gender Inequality Index (GDI) [2]	0.365	0.352	0.37	0.473
Mean years of schooling, females (years) [2]	10.5	9.6	8.3	10
Share of seats in parliament (% held by women) [2]	37.7	13.9	36	17
Labor-market and time use				
Female labor force participation rate, % age 15+ [2]	48.2	49.2	44.6	50.6
Total unemployment rate (female to male ratio) [2]	1.44	1.42	1	1.13
Urban population, % [2]	91.1	87.2	78.4	88.1
Family policies				
Paid maternity leave (in weeks, in 2014) [5]	13	18	12	26
Paid paternity leave (in days, in 2014) [5]	2	5	5	14
Public social expenditure as % of GDP [6]	12.1	14.6	9.6	14.4
Public social expenditure as % of total public expenditure [6]	57	67.9	52.3	49.3

Sources: [1] World Economic Forum 2012; [2] UN Development Programme; [3] UN Population Division: World Population prospects; [4] International Social Survey Programme (ISSP); [5] International Labour Organization (ILO); [6] UN-ECLAC Social Development - Social Investment Portal.

5.2. Ideal number of children and gender attitudes in the public and private spheres

Using the 2012 ISSP data, in this section, we specifically look at the relationship between ideal family size and gender-role attitudes in the public and private spheres. A quick glance at the ideal family size per country shows slightly lower fertility ideals in Mexico (2.29 children per women) and Venezuela (2.42) than in Chile (2.53) or Argentina (2.54). Overall, men have slightly higher ideals than women except in Argentina. Are there inner differences within countries depending on men's and women's positioning regarding gender-role attitudes?

Indicators 1 and 2 refer to gender roles in the public sphere confronting two competing ideas: 'only men should work for pay' (Figure 1) vs. 'both men and women should work for pay' (Figure 2). The traditionalism-pronatalism link is pretty universal when we measure gender-role attitudes with a gender-role pre-assigned statement as the indicator 1 '*A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family*', although such a link becomes weaker when it is measured through indicator 2 '*Both the man and woman should contribute to the household income*' which attributes to men and women the same role in the public sphere. When talking about separate gender roles (Figure 1), egalitarian respondents show, overall, lower fertility ideals than traditional respondents. However, in Figure 2 some groups contradict the traditionalism-pronatalism link by showing higher fertility ideals among egalitarians than among traditionals.

If we compare indicators 1 and 2 in detail, we observe how in Argentina and Chile traditional men tend to have a higher ideal number of children than egalitarian men for both indicators based on the public sphere. Albeit, this is not the case for Chilean women, and especially not the case for Argentinian women who show the reversed pattern in both cases. Venezuelans, who, when considering the separate spheres (Fig 1) join the traditional-pronatalist pattern, reverse this trend when envisioning men and women in the labor market (Fig 2), that is, egalitarian men, and especially women show higher fertility ideals than traditional respondents. Mexico is unique for being the only of these four countries in which egalitarian men report the same or a higher ideal family size than traditional men in both indicators. Mexico, unlike the rest, is also the only country in which traditional women have a higher fertility ideal than traditional men.

Figure 1 Ideal number of children by sex, country, and gender-role positioning regarding Indicator #1 "A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family"



Source: ISSP 2012.

Figure 2. Ideal number of children by sex, country, and gender-role positioning regarding Indicator #2. "Both the man and woman should contribute to the household income"



Source: ISSP 2012.

We then consider the two questions that more explicitly combine the role of men and women in the public and the private spheres (indicators 3 and 4). If Indicator 3 '*A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children*' is considered, our evidence shows one single trend in every country, for both women and men. People with a more traditional gender attitude

have a higher ideal number of children. There are different levels, related to different fertility ideals in each country –from near 2.25 children among Mexican women to more than 2.6 among Argentinian women-, but the trend is pervasive. Mexico is the country in which the gap between traditional and egalitarian respondents, and also between men and women, is remarkably smaller.

Finally, if we measure gender-role attitudes with indicator 4 '*Consider a family with a child under school age. What, in your opinion, is the best way for them to organize their family and work life?*', traditional men and women tend to desire more children than egalitarian ones in Chile and Mexico, but this link does not hold for Argentinian and Venezuelan women.

Figure 3. Ideal number of children by sex, country, and gender-role positioning regarding Indicator #3 "A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children"



Source: ISSP 2012.

Figure 4. Ideal number of children by sex, country, and gender-role positioning regarding Indicator # 4 "Consider a family with a child under school age. What, in your opinion, is the best way for them to organize their family and work life?"



Source: ISSP 2012.

Taking them together, it is interesting to highlight how when measuring fertility ideals through indicators that represent a pre-conception of traditional gender-roles (indicators 1 and 3) the positive relationship between traditionalism and fertility is more stable than when it is measured through gender-neutral statements. This might be a reflection of the importance of societal norms and expectations related to the role of women and mothers within the family. On the other hand, the greater ambivalence on the ideal family size between traditionals and egalitarians observed when we only account for the role of men and women in the labor market with no mention to the family domain (indicator 2) reflects the fact that women's labor force participation is today widely accepted. Nevertheless, acceptance of women's employment often remains coexisting with gender-essentialist beliefs that put the burden of care on women.

In sum, our hypothesis 1 presuming higher fertility ideals among traditional respondents is sustained by most data for the Latin American countries in our sample, but some interesting exceptions arise. These descriptive trends lead us to questioning what is behind some of these sex and country differences. What do those exceptions mean? We next explore the data using multivariate models to shed light into possible interpretations.

6. The determinants of fertility preferences in Latin America

(to be extended)

7. Discussion

(to be extended)

References

Almeras, D. (1997). *Compartir las responsabilidades familiares, una tarea para el desarrollo*, Documento de referencia, (6), Santiago de Chile: CEPAL

Arpino, B., Esping-Andersen, G., & Pessin, L. (2015). How do changes in gender role attitudes towards female employment influence fertility? A macro-level analysis. *European Sociological Review*, 31(3), 370–382.

Arriagada, I. (1998). *Latin American families: convergences and divergences in models and policies*. CEPAL Review.

Atoh, M., Kandiah, V., & Ivanov, S. (2004). The second demographic transition in Asia? Comparative analysis of the low fertility situation in East and South-East Asian countries. *The Japanese Journal of Population*, 2(1), 42–75.

Barker, G., Nascimento, M., Segundo, M., & Pulerwitz, J. (2004). How do we know if men have changed? Promoting and measuring attitude change with young men: lessons from Program H in Latin America. Gender Equality and Men: Learning from Practice. Oxfam, Oxford, UK.

Barker, G. and Verani F. (2008). *Men's Participation as Fathers in the Latin American and Caribbean Region. A Critical Literature Review with Policy Considerations*. Promundo. Save the children: Brasil.

Blake, J. (1974). Can we believe recent data on birth expectations in the United States? *Demography* 11(1): 25–44.

Bongaarts, J., & Lightbourne, R. (1992). Fecundidad deseada en América Latina: tendencias y diferenciales en siete países. *Notas de población*, 55: 77-102.

Brinton, M., Bueno, X., Olah, L., & Hellum, M. (2018). Postindustrial fertility ideals, intentions, and gender inequality: A comparative qualitative analysis. *Population and Development Review*, 44(2), 281–309.

Bueno, X. and Oh, E. (in press): Fatherhood and Parental Leave: A Comparative Study of South Korea, Spain and the U.S. In Grau-Grau, M. and Bowles, H. (Eds.): *Elevating Fatherhood: Policies, Organizations and Health & Wellbeing*. Springer International Publishing.

Casterline, J. B., and Mendoza, J. A. (2009). Unwanted fertility in Latin America: historical trends, recent patterns. Demographic transformations and inequalities in Latin America: historical trends and recent patterns. Cavenaghi S, editores. Rio de Janeiro: Alap, 193-218.

Chant, S. (2002). Researching gender, families and households in Latin America: From the 20th into the 21st century. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 21(4), 545-575.

Charles, M., and Grusky, D.B. (2004). *Occupational Ghettos: The Worldwide Segregation of Women and Men*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Chackiel, J and Schkolnik, S. (2004) América Latina: los sectores rezagados en la transición de la fecundidad. In: La fecundidad en América Latina: ¿Transición o revolución?. United Nations, Santiago de Chile, ECLAC/CEPAL, Serie: Seminarios y conferencias, no. 36. 496 p.

Cotter, D., Hermsen, J. M., & Vanneman, R. (2011). The end of the gender revolution? Gender role attitudes from 1977 to 2008. *American Journal of Sociology*, 117(1), 259–289.

Davis, S. N., & Greenstein, T. N. (2009). Gender ideology: Components, predictors, and consequences. *Annual review of Sociology*, 35, 87-105.

England, P. (2010). The gender revolution: Uneven and stalled. *Gender & society*, *24*(2), 149-166.

Esping-Andersen, G., & Billari, F. C. (2015). Re-theorizing family demographics. *Population and Development Review*, 41(1), 1–31.

Friedman, S. (2015). Still a "stalled revolution"? Work/family experiences, hegemonic masculinity, and moving toward gender equality. Sociology Compass, 9(2), 140-155.

Goldscheider, F., Bernhardt, E., & Lappegård, T. (2015). The gender revolution: A framework for understanding changing family and demographic behavior. *Population and Development Review*, 41(2), 207–239.

Goldscheider, F., Oláh, L. S., & Puur, A. (2010). Reconciling studies of men's gender attitudes and fertility: Response to Westoff and Higgins. *Demographic Research*, 22, 189-198.

Grunow, D., Begall, K., & Buchler, S. (2018). Gender ideologies in Europe: A multidimensional framework. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 80(1), 42-60.

Guetto R, Luijkx R, Scherer S. (2015) Religiosity, gender attitudes and women's labour market participation and fertility decisions in Europe. Acta Sociologica; 58(2):155–172.

Guzmán, J.M. (1996). Social Change and fertility decline in Latin America. In: Guzmán, J.M. (ed.) The Fertility Transition in Latin America. Oxford University Press.

Hakkert, R. (2004). Fecundidad deseada y no deseada en América Latina, con particular referencia a algunos aspectos de género. En: *La fecundidad en América Latina: ¿transición o revolución?*-LC/L. 2097-P-2004-p. 267-288.

Hochschild A. and Machung A. (1989). *The Second Shift*. New York: Viking

Hoem, J. M., Kostova, D., Jasilioniene, A., & Mureşan, C. (2009). Traces of the second demographic transition in four selected countries in Central and Eastern Europe: Union

formation as a demographic manifestation. *European Journal of Population*, 25(3), 239–255.

Kaufman, G. (2000). Do gender role attitudes matter? Family Formation and Dissolution Among Traditional and Egalitarian Men and Women. *Journal of Family Issues* 21(1):128-144.

Kertzer, D. I., White, M. J., Bernardi, L., & Gabrielli, G. (2009). Italy's path to very low fertility: The adequacy of economic and second demographic transition theories. *European Journal of Population*, 25(1), 89–115.

Knight, C. R., & Brinton, M. C. (2017). One egalitarianism or several? Two decades of gender-role attitude change in Europe. *American Journal of Sociology*, 122(5), 1485-1532.

Lesthaeghe, R. (1995). The second demographic transition – An interpretation. In K. Mason & A. M. Jensen (Eds.), *Gender and family change in industrialized countries* (pp. 17–62). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lima, E. E., Zeman, K., & Sobotka, T. (2018). Twentieth century changes in family size in Latin America: Analyses through cohort fertility and parity progression. Paper presented at the Population Association of America Annual Meeting in Denver, CO.

Martínez-Franzoni, J.(2005), Regímenes de bienestar en América Latina: consideraciones generales e itinerarios regionales, *Revista centroamericana de ciencias sociales*, vol. 2, N° 2, San José, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO).

Mason, K.O. and Smith, H.L. (2000). Husbands' versus wives' fertility goals and use of contraception: The influence of gender context in five Asian countries. *Demography* 37:299-311

McDonald, P. (2000a). Gender equity in theories of fertility transition. *Population and Development Review*, 26(3), 427–439.

McDonald, P. (2000b). Gender equity, social institutions and the future of fertility. *Journal of Population Research*, 17(1), 1–16.

McDonald, P. (2006). Low fertility and the state: The efficacy of policy, *Population and Development Review* 32(3): 485–510.

Miller, W. B. (2011). Differences between fertility desires and intentions: Implications for theory, research and policy. Vienna Yearbook of Population Research, 9, 75–98

Mills, M. (2010). Gender roles, gender (in)equality and fertility: An empirical test of five gender equity indices. *Canadian Studies in Population*, 37, 445-474.

Mills, M., Mencarini, L., Tanturri, M. L., & Begall, K. (2008). Gender equity and fertility intentions in Italy and the Netherlands. *Demographic Research*, 18, 1-26.

Perelli-Harris, B., & Gerber, T. P. (2011). Nonmarital childbearing in russia: Second demographic transition or pattern of disadvantage? *Demography*, 48(1), 317–342.

Philipov, D. (2008). Family-related gender attitudes: The three dimensions--"gender role ideology", "consequences for the family", and "economic consequences". In: Ch. Höhn, Avramov, D., and Kotowska, I. (eds.). *People, population change and policies: Lessons from the Population Policy Acceptance Study*. Springer: 153-174.

Philipov, D., and Bernardi, L. (2011). Concepts and operationalisation of reproductive decisions implementation in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. *Comparative Population Studies*, 36(2-3), 495-530.

Puur, A., Oláh, L. S., Tazi-Preve, M. I., & Dorbritz, J. (2008). Men's childbearing desires and views of the male role in Europe at the dawn of the 21st century. *Demographic research*, 19, 1883-1912.

Raley, R. K. (2001). Increasing fertility in cohabiting unions: Evidence for the second demographic transition in the United States? *Demography*, 38(1), 59–66.

Schkolnik, S. and Chackiel, J. (1998). América Latina: La transición demográfica en sectores rezagados, *Notas de Población*, 67/68, 8-53.

Sobotka, T. (2008). The diverse faces of the second demographic transition in Europe. *Demographic Research*, 19(8), 171–224.

Sobotka, T., & Beaujouan, É. (2014). Two is best? The persistence of a two-child family ideal in Europe. *Population and Development Review*, 40(3), 391–419.

Sobotka, T., Zeman, K., & Kantorová, V. (2003). Demographic shifts in the Czech Republic after 1989: A second demographic transition view. *European Journal of Population*, 19(3), 249–277.

Sullivan, O., Billari, F. C., & Altintas, E. (2014). Fathers' changing contributions to child care and domestic work in very low-fertility countries: The effect of education. *Journal of Family Issues*, 35(8), 1048–1065.

Sullivan, O., Gershuny, J., & Robinson, J. P. (2018). Stalled or Uneven Gender Revolution? A Long-Term Processual Framework for Understanding Why Change Is Slow. *Journal of Family Theory & Review*, 10(1), 263-279.

Surkyn, J., & Lesthaeghe, R. (2004). Value orientations and the second demographic transition (SDT) in Northern, Western and Southern Europe: An update. *Demographic Research*, 3, 45–86.

Tazi-Preve, I., Bichlbauer, D., & Goujon, A. (2004). Gender trouble and its impact on fertility intentions. *Yearbook of Population Research in Finland*, 40, 5-24.

Testa, M.R. (2007). Childbearing preferences and family issues in Europe: evidence from the Eurobarometer 2006 survey. *Vienna Yearbook of Population Research* 2007: 357-379.

Testa, M. R. (2011). Family sizes in Europe: Evidence from the 2011 Eurobarometer Survey. *European Demographic Research Papers*

Thomson, E. (2002). Family size preferences. In: Smelser, Neil J., and Baltes, Paul B. (eds), *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*. Elsevier, New York.

Van de Kaa, D. (1987). Europe's second demographic transition. *Population Bulletin*, 42(1), 1–59.

Westoff, C. F., & Higgins, J. A. (2009). Relationships between men's gender attitudes and fertility: Response to Puur, et al.'s "Men's childbearing desires and views of the male role in Europe at the dawn of the 21st century", Demographic Research 19: 1883–1912. *Demographic Research*, 21(3): 65-74.